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KEY POINTS 
• The UK is searching for the framework of post-Brexit trade arrangements with the EU but the EU is limited 
in the kind of trade arrangements it offers to third countries. 
• A new kind of trade agreement with Ukraine has recently become fully operational. A similar agreement 
may offer a way forward for the UK-EU negotiations. It could combine access to the Single Market, 
maintenance of, and involvement in, the creation of technical standards, and application of the same 
norms to procurement and competition, but without the obligations of full membership of the EU.
• The Agreement also offers a “buy in” to other EU policies but these are not conditional on subscribing to 
the price of full membership of the EU.
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INTRODUCTION
There is no clear indication where negotiations will take 
the EU-UK trade relationship. A clean Brexit from the EU 
has always been unrealistic1 and the EU is not flexible 
in its models of external trade negotiations. Ultimately 
the nature of EU trade policy is determined by political 
negotiation between the Member States, with the 
European Commission mediating the political differences. 
But there are legal, indeed, constitutional, constraints 
upon the scope for manoeuvre in the EU external relations 
policy. In reality, existing models of EU external trade 
agreements can be broken down into two main types, 
loosely identified as “near” or “far” trade.2 What is clear 
is that, in both forms of external action, the EU has been 
successful in creating a regulatory magnet where its 
preferred technical standards dominate trade provisions.
1  The Prime Minister’s September 2017 speech envisages that 
the UK should negotiate an implementation arrangement for trade 
until the detail of a permanent relationship has been fully ironed out 
and implemented: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-
florence-speech-a-new-era-of-cooperation-and-partnership-between-the-
uk-and-the-eu
2  The state of play of EU trade agreements and negotiations as at 
September 2017 can be found at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
docs/2006/december/tradoc_118238.pdf
The first set of trade arrangements is based upon close 
proximity to the EU – a direct neighbourhood policy 
which involves extending EU regulatory norms to a wider 
geographical area. This approach is seen in the EEA 
arrangement with Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein3 
as well as the agreements with Switzerland.4 The trade 
agreement with Turkey is more complicated, resulting 
in Turkey being part of the EU customs union (with an 
exclusion for agriculture) and, therefore, a requirement that 
Turkey adopts EU technical industrial standards.5 
The second set of trade agreements is used with countries 
further afield, for example, Canada6, South Korea7 and 
the current negotiations with Japan.8 These agreements 
may be viewed as the classic kind of international free 
trade agreements where the EU is not able to dominate 
3  http://www.efta.int/eea/eea-agreement
4  https://www.eda.admin.ch/dea/en/home/bilaterale-abkommen.
html
5  http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/
countries/turkey/
6  http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/
7  http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/
countries/south-korea/
8  http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/eu-japan-economic-
partnership-agreement/
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application of conditionality to trade agreements. Part 
V addresses the role of arbitration and the need for a 
dispute resolution system that is acceptable to the UK and 
the EU. Part VI describes the substance of approximation 
of Ukrainian law to the EU acquis and how this would not 
be an onerous issue for the UK in unravelling its own 
relationship with EU law.
I .  A NEW TYPE OF INTEGRATION 
WITHOUT MEMBERSHIP
The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (AA)10 is hailed 
as an innovative form of external action, offering a new 
type of integration without membership of the EU, for 
the creation of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Area (DCFTA).11 But Downes (2017) argues that the 
agreement is not consonant with the aims of the EU 
2004 European Neighbourhood Policy, which strives to 
avoid creating new divisions in Europe and to promote 
stability and prosperity within and beyond the borders of 
the newly-enlarged EU. Indeed, in the Council Decisions 
implementing the provisional application of the AA in June 
2014 there is no mention of Article 8 TEU.12 Neither is the 
Agreement consonant with the 2009 Eastern Partnership, 
described by Füle as aiming to anchor stability, democracy 
and prosperity to partner states in the European 
neighbourhood.13 The Agreement is a mixed agreement 
in EU law and has only recently been ratified by The 
Netherlands.14 However, the political importance of the AA 
for Ukraine and the EU is revealed in that, since January 
2016, the EU and Ukraine have provisionally applied 
certain Titles of the Agreement.15
10  The EU-Ukraine AA can be accessed at: http://collections.
internetmemory.org/haeu/20160313172652/http://eeas.europa.
eu/ukraine/docs/association_agreement_ukraine_2014_en.pdf.  
See Van der Loo et al. (2014).
11  Bouris and Schumaker (2017); Hoekman et al (2013); Tyushka 
(2016).
12  Art 8 TEU was introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon 2009 and 
grants the Union specific competence to conclude Agreements with 
neighbouring states. Art 8 TEU mentions a clear duty of the Union to 
“develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming 
to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded 
on the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful 
relations based on co-operation. The lack of a reference to the 
“neighbourhood” is due to Ukraine no longer perceiving itself to be a 
neighbour but a European state.
13  Štefan Füle “EU-Ukraine: Dispelling the Myths About the 
Association Agreement” Speech by the Commissioner for 
Enlargement at the international conference “The Way Ahead for  the 
Eastern Partnership” held in Kiev, 11 October 2013. Available at:  
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-808_en.htm
14  Szyszczak (2016).
15  Article 486 of the EU-Ukraine AA foresaw difficulties in ratification 
and allowed for the provisional application of the Agreement. Titles 
III, V, VI and VII, and the related Annexes and Protocols have been 
provisionally applied from 1 November 2014; Title IV has been 
applied from 1 January 2016.
the agenda. Regulatory cooperative arrangements refer 
to international technical standards or international 
conventions in chapters dedicated to issues such as the 
environment or intellectual property. In many instances 
these international standards will have been heavily 
influenced by the EU. 
Beyond these two broad frameworks the EU appears to 
have little room to manoeuvre. This explains why the 
demands from the UK to negotiate a new and bespoke 
trade agreement pose a challenge. The UK has set out 
that it wants a deep and comprehensive agreement with 
the EU but it would seem that a bespoke agreement may 
have to be fashioned out of the existing choices. One 
model of a new agreement for a state wanting a deep and 
comprehensive relationship with the EU is the EU-Ukraine 
Association Agreement that came fully into force on 1 
September 2017. This model offers some new ideas on 
how the UK could access the EU Single Market without 
the benefits and obligations of full EU membership. This 
could be described as a “Ukraine plus” model. Aspects 
the “plus agenda” for the UK would be a discussion of 
EU Citizenship rights and how to solve the issues of the 
border between Northern Ireland and Eire.
The model of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement offers 
many positive aspects for a framework for the EU-UK trade 
relationship in the form of tariff-free access for goods 
and passports for services, and customs cooperation. 
The immigration issue is dealt with by subjecting the 
movement of labour to a visa liberalisation9 and work 
permit system. Competition, state aid, anti-dumping and 
public procurement regulation alignment is a necessary 
part of the agreement. Ukraine also has the option of 
“buying in” to a number of EU common programmes, for 
example, the Horizon 2020 research programme as well 
as EU agencies such as Europol. Ukraine may also choose 
to participate in a wider set of EU common policies such 
as transport, environment, employment and consumer 
protection policies. The agreement envisages future 
political cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs 
as well as foreign, security and defence policies.
This paper outlines the major aspects of the EU-Ukraine 
Association Agreement, suggesting how the Agreement 
could be a framework for thinking about future UK-EU 
negotiations. Part I explains why the Agreement is an 
innovative Agreement. Part II examines the legal basis 
of the Agreement. Part III examines the new institutional 
and governance arrangements of the AA, suggesting links 
with EU agencies and institutions could be valuable in a 
future post-Brexit deal for the UK. Part IV examines the 
9  This was achieved by an amendment to the general EU 
Regulation governing third country visa regulations in the EU: 
REGULATION 2017/850 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
OF THE COUNCIL of 17 May 2017 amending Regulation (EC) No 
539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in 
possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those 
whose nationals are exempt from that requirement (Ukraine), OJ L 
2017 133/1.
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I I .  THE EU LEGAL BASE
The EU-Ukraine AA was adopted by a Council Decision on 
17 March 2014. The EU legal base used is a combination 
of the Common Foreign and Security Policy legal base 
(Arts. 31(1) and 37 TEU) and the Association provisions 
(Art. 217 TFEU)). Both legal bases require unanimity 
voting in the Council. The combination of CFSP/TFEU legal 
bases reflects the comprehensive nature of the AA and 
the continuing bipolarity of the external competence of the 
EU found in Article 40 TEU. The AA is, therefore, a mixed 
agreement requiring ratification at the Member State level. 
The aim of the AA is to integrate Ukraine into the 
EU internal market. Thus, a new dimension is the 
mechanisms by which the relevant EU laws are 
approximated by Ukraine, alongside the new and 
sophisticated mechanisms to secure the uniform 
interpretation and effective implementation of relevant EU 
legislation in Ukraine.
The EU-Ukraine AA is based on a strict conditionality 
approach. The Preamble to the Agreement explicitly states 
that:
“…political association and economic integration 
of Ukraine within the European Union will depend 
on progress in the implementation of the current 
agreement as well as Ukraine’s track record in 
ensuring respect for common values, and progress 
in achieving convergence with the EU in political, 
economic and legal areas.”
The link between the third country’s performance and 
the deepening of the EU’s engagement is seen in the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern 
Partnership (EaP). But this principle has been applied 
using soft-law instruments.16 With Ukraine it is embedded 
in a legally-binding bilateral agreement. 
Even if a new trade agreement with the UK contained a 
conditionality clause, the current UK terms of membership 
of the EU should satisfy the values inherent within the 
EU system. It remains to be seen how far other European 
values, relating to non-discrimination, environmental 
concerns, for example, are shelved or watered down once 
the UK has left the EU.
Already, in clause 5(4) of the EU Withdrawal Bill, currently 
before Parliament, the Government has shown its hand 
and indicated that the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the EU17 will not be incorporated into UK law after Brexit. 
But this makes legal sense since the Charter only applies 
when a Member State is implementing EU law. What 
is lost for the future is the uncertainty of whether the 
developing jurisprudence on interpreting the text of the 
16  See the essays in Ratka and Spaiser (eds) (2012).
17  Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/
charter/index_en.htm
Charter, and the possibility of extraterritorial application, 
will be taken into account by the UK courts after Brexit. 
There are elements within the Conservative Party that 
believe that the UK should revise the legal position of 
human rights protection in the UK, for example, leave the 
ECHR system and repeal, or replace, the domestic Human 
Rights Act 1998, but these elements were drowned when 
Prime Minister May called an early General Election. Any 
reform of human rights legislation will not take place while 
Brexit negotiations are ongoing.18
I I I .  A NEW INSTITUTIONAL 
FRAMEWORK
The new dimension to EU external relations is shown in the 
EU-Ukraine AA with a reinforced institutional framework, 
enhanced forms of conditionality, and more sophisticated 
legal mechanisms for the approximation of laws and 
dispute settlement than has previously been seen in EU 
Association Agreements.
Annual Summit meetings form the public focal point of the 
importance of the AA.19 These have an added symbolic 
resonance, and provide accountability and transparency to 
the approximation process. Decision-making takes place 
within the site of an Association Council composed of 
Ministers. A Parliamentary Association Committee may 
make recommendations to the Association Council. This 
body the power to update and amend the AA Annexes, as 
well as exchange information on the approximation of laws 
process.20 It is assisted by an Association Committee, 
with a specialized sub-committee, composed of civil 
servants.21 These bodies address the technical aspects of 
approximation of Ukraine’s trade laws with the EU acquis. 
This kind of institutional arrangement may be necessary 
for a bespoke UK-EU agreement since the UK will have to 
conform to EU and international technical standards if it 
wants to trade in global markets. 
What is also novel in this new structure is a Civil Society 
Platform, replicating the involvement of Civil Society in 
EU policy-making. The Platform is built from members 
of the European Economic and Social Committee22 
18  Christopher Hope, “Britain to be bound by European human 
rights laws for at least another five years even if Tories win election” 
18 May 2017, The Telegraph: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/2017/05/18/britain-bound-european-human-rights-laws-least-
another-five/
19  Art 460 EU-Ukraine AA.
20  There are 44 Annexes which provide the mechanism for the 
evolution and response to dynamic changes in EU law and policy.
21  Art 464 EU-Ukraine AA.
22  On the EU side there are 9 EESC members and 6 permanent 
observers from the European civil society networks (Eurochambres, 
BusinessEurope, ETUC, Copa-Cogeca, cooperatives Europe, EaP Civil 
Society Forum. Details of the work to date and Reports can be found 
at: http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.ukraine-csp
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and representatives of civil society from Ukraine, with 
fifteen members each from the EU and Ukraine. Chapter 
26 of the AA on Civil Society cooperation explains the 
role of Civil Society in the AA: to ensure social and 
cultural dialogues and “a better mutual knowledge and 
understanding between the parties” in areas such as trade 
and sustainable development. This is an important site for 
Ukraine to allow civil society a voice in the development 
of trade, alongside any redistributive effects the impact 
of trade may bring for Ukraine. The EU has been skilful in 
developing the role of civil society as part of the balance to 
executive power in the EU, and the European Commission 
has been careful to use and coordinate such networks 
to its advantage to counterbalance the dominance of the 
political power of the Member States (Szyszczak 2013). 
IV.  CONDITIONALITY
Hard Core Common Values
The EU-Ukraine AA utilises a conditionality tool to commit 
Ukraine to the common European values of democracy, 
the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. These aspects of fundamental rights 
conditionality are found in in the European Neighbourhood 
Policy and are based not only on EU norms but also 
international norms.23 The AA distinguishes between a set 
of hard core common values related to fundamental rights 
and security and a set of wider principles that are seen 
as necessary for the AA to function, but not necessarily 
serious enough to suspend the operation of the AA.24
Dialogue and Co-operation on Domestic Reform
There is an additional condition attached to the AA in 
Article 6 where human rights and fundamental freedoms 
are also a condition to a “dialogue and cooperation on 
domestic reform.” Similarly in Article 14, human rights 
and fundamental freedoms are included in cooperation 
on justice, freedom and security. Here the EU-Ukraine AA 
is more sophisticated than previous external agreements 
and refers specifically to the “promotion of respect for the 
principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, inviolability 
of borders and independence, as well as countering the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, related 
materials and their means of delivery.”
Access to the EU Internal Market
A different strand of conditionality is seen in relation 
to the commitment to the DCFTA. Market access to 
the EU Internal Market will only be available under a 
strict monitoring procedure, confirming that Ukraine 
has implemented its commitment to the approximation 
23  The Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, the 
UN Declaration on Human Rights and the ECHR 1950.
24  Art 478.
of its laws to the acquis. The monitoring tool is re-
utilised from the procedures used in the central and 
eastern Enlargement process pre-2004. Ukraine is 
expected to provide reports to the EU according to the 
approximation deadlines set out in Art 475(2) of the 
AA. Innovatively, there may be “on-the-spot missions, 
with the participation of EU bodies and agencies, non-
governmental bodies, supervisory authorities, independent 
experts and others as needed.”25 The level of detail and 
the timetable of the approximation provisions, including 
provisions to accommodate the dynamic evolution of EU 
law, is in contrast to earlier PCA and other Association 
Agreements.26
The monitoring procedures are to be discussed within the 
auspices of the joint bodies and the bodies may adopt 
recommendations, using a unanimity voting process. The 
Association Council or the Trade Committee are the only 
bodies that may decide if there should be further market-
opening. This will depend upon whether the DCFTA has 
been implemented and enforced. Recommendations or 
decisions of the joint institutions (or if there is a failure 
to reach an agreement) may not be challenged under the 
DCFTA dispute settlement procedure.27
In addition, there is a list of elements which are not 
regarded as essential elements but are considered to 
underpin the relationship between the EU and Ukraine; 
they are viewed as central to enhancing the relationship 
but a failure to adhere to them will not trigger the 
suspension of the AA.28 Within this list, the principles of a 
free market economy are a core element underpinning the 
economic and social development of Ukraine. 
The UK would presumably have very few problems in 
aligning its existing laws to the EU acquis. The UK had a 
good record of implementing EU obligations into domestic 
law through the European Communities Act 1972. Because 
the UK currently has a strong lobbying presence in 
Brussels and weight at the negotiating table, the UK does 
not normally find itself out-voted when EU legislation is 
being considered and there have been few cases brought 
by the European Commission (or other Member States) 
for non-compliance with EU law. The bulk of EU regulation 
tends to be adopted by a “copy and paste” process using 
secondary (delegated) legislation. The ECA 1972 allows 
for EU law to give rise to direct effect in the national legal 
system, alongside the controversial quality of bestowing 
supremacy of EU law over national law. It gives effect to 
rulings of the European Courts. The EU Withdrawal Bill, 
if passed, and without amendment, would remove all the 
provisions guaranteed by the ECA 1972. In order to avoid 
25  Art 475(3) AA.
26  Art 474. There are 44 Annexes setting out the detail of 
approximation.
27  Art 475(6) AA.
28  The principles of free market economy, rule of law, the fight 
against corruption, the fight against different forms of trans-national 
crime and terrorism, the promotion of sustainable development and 
effective multilateralism. Art 3.
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a legal vacuum and regulatory gaps, pre-Brexit EU law and 
European Court judgments remain in force until they are 
withdrawn or amended by either Government or Parliament. 
Pre-Brexit European Court judgments retain their status 
until they are amended by Government or Parliament or 
overruled by the UK Supreme Court. The UK courts would 
have the option to take into account post-Brexit European 
Court case law. There is some uncertainty as to the status 
of EU law during any transition or implementation period. 
Mrs May was silent on this aspect in her September 2017 
Florence speech and avoided a question on the point in 
the Q &A session. The EU would want to retain the status 
quo during any transitional arrangements. Subsequently 
the Prime Minister – in a Brexit Statement on 10 October 
2017 – told the House of Commons that the UK would be 
bound by rulings of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU).29
Clause 9 of the EU Withdrawal Bill grants the UK 
government unlimited power to amend any UK laws to give 
effect to any post-Brexit agreement that defines the future 
trade relationship with the EU. Thus the UK government 
is in a strong position to control the adherence to EU 
law and future obligations under a new Association trade 
agreement, and to satisfy any conditionality require-
ments built into a future agreement. The challenge will 
be to ensure that any EU recognition of new UK technical 
standards – and bodies creating and validating such 
standards – are recognised as appropriate by the EU.
V. COURTS AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The role of the European Courts (and indeed the role of 
the European Commission) in any future trade deal based 
around the EU-Ukraine AA framework would be one of the 
most contentious areas to grapple with.30 
When the EEA Agreement was negotiated the CJEU 
refused to accept that new judicial institutions could be 
established within the framework of EU law.31 An EEA 
court was proposed, which would have been functionally 
integrated with the CJEU. When sitting in plenary session 
the proposed court would have been composed of 5 CJEU 
Judges and 3 Judges nominated by the EFTA States. In an 
Opinion32 on the compatibility with the then EEC Treaty of 
the new judicial mechanism creating the CJEU held that: 
‘It follows that the jurisdiction conferred on the EEA 
Court under Article 2(c), Article 96(1)(a) and Article 
29  https://www.theguardian.com/politics/blog/live/2017/oct/09/
snp-conference-sturgeon-says-brexit-developing-disaster-and-case-for-
2nd-referendum-getting-difficult-to-resist-politics-live
30  See the BBC News:  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
politics-41426620
31  There are similar issues over the accession of the EU to the 
ECHR and how to balance the respective competence of the CJEU 
and the ECtHR.
32  Opinion 1/91 ECR [1991] I-6079.
117(1) of the [draft] agreement is likely adversely to 
affect the allocation of responsibilities defined in the 
Treaties and, hence, the autonomy of the Community 
legal order, respect for which must be assured by 
the Court of Justice pursuant to Article 164 of the 
EEC Treaty. This exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice is confirmed by Article 219 of the EEC Treaty, 
under which Member States undertake not to submit 
a dispute concerning the interpretation or application 
of that treaty to any method of settlement other than 
those provided for in the Treaty. Article 87 of the 
ECSC Treaty embodies a provision to the same effect. 
Consequently, to confer that jurisdiction on the EEA 
Court is incompatible with Community law.’33
After renegotiation, a Surveillance Authority and a Court 
of Justice (the EFTA Court) were seen as satisfactory and 
compliant with EU law by the CJEU in Opinion 1/92.34
The UK government has set out its views on how 
future disputes could be resolved in a position paper, 
Enforcement and dispute resolution - a future partnership 
paper (23 August 2017).35 This Paper recognises that 
‘there are a number of additional means [not involving 
the direct jurisdiction of the CJEU] by which the EU 
has entered into agreements which offer assurance of 
effective enforcement and dispute resolution and, where 
appropriate, avoidance of divergence, without necessitating 
the direct jurisdiction of the CJEU over a third party’ (para 
67). An example explicitly recognised in the Paper (at 
paragraph 20) is the Association Agreement with Ukraine 
which serves to exemplify where the EU has accepted 
binding international arbitration mechanisms. 
However, in the EU-Ukraine Agreement the arbitration 
mechanism is geared towards ensuring CJEU supremacy in 
the interpretation of EU law. Art 322(2) sets out that:
‘[w]here a dispute raises a question of interpretation 
of a provision of EU law [relating to regulatory 
approximation contained in Chapter 3 (Technical 
Barriers to Trade), Chapter 4 (Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures), Chapter 5 (Customs and 
Trade Facilitation), Chapter 6 (Establishment, Trade in 
Services and Electronic Commerce), Chapter 8 (Public 
Procurement) or Chapter 10 (Competition), or which 
otherwise imposes upon a Party an obligation defined 
by reference to a provision of EU law], the arbitration 
panel shall not decide the question, but request 
the Court of Justice of the European Union to give a 
ruling on the question. In such cases, the deadlines 
applying to the rulings of the arbitration panel shall be 
suspended until the Court of Justice of the European 
Union has given its ruling. The ruling of the Court of 
33  Opinion 1/91 ECR [1991] I-6079, at I-6084.
34  Opinion 1/92 [1992] ECR I-252.
35  https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/639609/Enforcement_and_dispute_resolution.
pdf
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Justice of the European Union shall be binding on the 
arbitration panel.’ 
Therefore, this may not be the model that the UK would 
subscribe to in order to resolve disputes over the 
interpretation of a post-Brexit trade agreement. Reference 
to an arbitration panel recognising the UK and the EU 
as equal partners would presumably be the preferred 
approach of the UK, requiring the EU to adapt its position 
on the role of supremacy of EU law in external Treaties as 
well as the central role of the CJEU in upholding EU law, as 
set out in Article 19(1) of the Treaty of Lisbon: 
‘The Court of Justice of the European Union shall 
include the Court of Justice, the General Court 
and specialised courts. It shall ensure that in the 
interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is 
observed.’
VI .  THE SUBSTANCE OF 
APPROXIMATION
Van de Loo et al (2014:14) describe the approximation of 
Ukrainian law with the EU acquis as a “patchwork”.36 This 
is because Ukraine is starting from a blank canvas, as 
well as grappling with many economic and political issues 
that are not found in the UK. Quite obviously technical 
barriers to trade occupy an important space, but the AA 
also focuses heavily on the liberalised industries and on 
Services, Establishment and Electronic Commerce. These 
are all sectors where the UK would have little difficulty 
– and indeed would be welcomed by the sectors – in 
maintaining the EU regulatory framework. The crunch will 
come where arrangements are thrashed out for the UK to 
participate in future standard setting.
In tandem to the general approximation programme, the 
DCFTA also focuses upon the approximation of public 
procurement legislation.37 Once Ukraine has implemented 
this requirement it will have the novel opportunity of 
access to the vast EU public procurement market – an 
opportunity only accorded to third states under the EEA.38 
This may prove to be a major incentive for direct foreign 
investment as businesses from third country states 
(which in the future will include the UK) have an incentive 
to establish in Ukraine, particularly as joint ventures. 
Such an arrangement would also be welcomed in post-
Brexit UK, especially since the EU legislation was heavily 
influenced by the UK negotiating position wanting a light 
touch where social procurement was at stake, and has 
been transposed into UK law through “copy and paste” 
36  See also Van Elsuwege and Petrov (2014).
37  Art 153 AA. This is a structured implementation programme, 
divided into Basic Elements, Mandatory Elements and Non-
Mandatory elements derived from the EU Public Procurement 
Directives 2004/18/EC and 2004/17/EC.
38  For a deeper discussion see Sanchez-Graells (2017).
procedures with little controversy.39 
In relation to competition law, there appears to be a 
break in the link between fulfilment of the obligations to 
approximate domestic law and additional market access. 
Chapter 10 of the AA has a detailed set of competition 
law provisions, mirroring the EU provisions on competition 
law and policy, which must be included in Ukrainian 
reforms. This is an unusual aspect of the AA; in other 
sectors, the Annexes are used to work out the detail, with 
the idea that there can be some flexibility in amendment. 
The fact that there is a detailed competition chapter in 
the actual Treaty is novel for EU external relations as 
well as for international Treaties in general. It reflects 
the growing interest in including completion (antitrust) 
chapters in trade agreements as well as cooperation 
and information exchange networks at the global level. 
Again, the UK has had few problems in implementing EU 
competition law in the UK and has a robust regulatory 
and enforcement environment, often going beyond EU 
requirements. 
A competition chapter in a future EU-UK trade agreement 
would be welcomed by consumers as well as business.40 
There will be a need for future co-operation between the 
CMA and the European Commission41 for many years to 
come. There will be many historical issues to grapple 
with, for example: ongoing commitments agreed to under 
the EU competition and merger rules; the question of 
how to enforce anti-competitive behaviour pre-Brexit 
where historical evidence comes to light; as well as the 
implementation of on-going European Commission and 
European Court cases on the date of Brexit. There will 
be future issues including, inter alia, how to tackle anti-
competitive conduct by UK firms having an impact on 
the Single Market and, vice versa, how to enforce UK 
competition law against firms based in the EU but having 
an effect on the UK market. The role of State aid will also 
be a concern for any future trade deal, particularly if it is 
used to pursue a new industrial policy for the UK.42 
39  See UK Government Guidance EU Procurement Directives and 
the UK Regulations: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/transposing-eu-
procurement-directives
40  The House of Lords’ EU Internal Market sub-committee is 
currently conducting an inquiry into Brexit: competition, see: https://
www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-
select/eu-internal-market-subcommittee/inquiries/parliament-2017/
brexit-competition-inquiry/
41  And national competition regulators through the European 
Competition Network Including any enhancement of the powers of 
the ECN from the ECN+ : Proposal for a Directive to empower the 
competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective 
enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market 
Brussels, 22.3.2017 COM(2017) 142 final, available at: http://
ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/proposed_directive_en.pdf
42  See Erika Szyszczak, “State Aid is On the Agenda: Deal or No 
Deal”, UKTPO Blog, 6 October 2017. Available at: https://blogs.
sussex.ac.uk/uktpo/2017/10/06/state-aid/
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CONCLUSION
At first sight the EU-Ukraine AA presents as yet another 
attempt by the EU to extend its territorial influence 
into new markets with an even deeper expectation of 
commitment from Ukraine to adopt the EU regulatory 
framework and rules (the acquis) as a condition of trade. 
This reinforces the regulatory core of the EU as a major 
trading bloc and this is not necessarily a problem for 
Ukraine. Compliance with EU standards will open up 
international markets for Ukraine in a new geographic 
trade network. 
The research on trade and fragile states is limited but 
there are clear repercussions of the effects of trade for 
Ukraine in terms of internal reforms to facilitate trade 
through new competition, procurement and anti-corruption 
policies, including enforcement mechanisms. Through 
the AA, Ukraine insists that it is an equal partner as a 
“European” state. This alters the cultural as well as the 
political identity of Ukraine.43
Compliance with the EU acquis in terms of social and 
human rights values is not necessarily regressive for 
Ukraine. The under-development of the social dimension 
to EU integration has been criticized but the perceived 
impact of Brexit on UK employment and environmental 
standards has brought home the value of the use of 
supranational benchmarks as minimum requirements, 
especially once it is realised they could be watered down 
(or even withdrawn) in the future. 
This paper is a brief attempt to contribute to the 
forward-looking discussion of how the UK can unravel 
its trade relationship with the EU and renegotiate 
a new relationship. The EU trade agreement with 
Ukraine reveals that the EU is willing to adapt previous 
Association Agreements to new circumstances. For the 
UK, the adoption of this approach would require less 
unravelling of existing UK laws, but offer some room 
for independence in negotiating future issues. Such 
an Agreement provides access to the Single Market, 
maintains inward investment incentives and provides 
an attractive location for establishment, especially in 
the services sector. This is one area the UK is keen to 
protect. But the EU-Ukraine AA allows the EU to keep the 
upper hand in setting the agenda, the terms of entry to 
the EU market and the role of EU law, and the European 
Court of Justice. Thus, there may need to be a little more 
flexibility on the part of the EU if this type of Agreement 
is to serve as a new framework for the future UK trade 
relationship with the EU.
43  Van der Loo and Van Elsuwege (2012).
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